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WITHDRAWING FROM CUSTOM: CHOOSING
BETWEEN DEFAULT RULES
RACHEL BREWSTER*
INTRODUCTION
Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati’s article, Withdrawing from
International Custom, is a novel, provocative, and important contribution
to the scholarship on customary international law. They argue that the
current approach to customary international law, the Mandatory View,
which holds that states cannot unilaterally opt out of custom but allows
states to do so by treaty, is overly restrictive. They propose an alternative
approach, the Default View, which would permit states to opt out
unilaterally when doing so would not injure another nation. The article
raises a number of interesting issues, including how the Mandatory View
became the consensus in international law scholarship, the role of the
persistent objector principle, and the functional value of maintaining the
Mandatory View. The article also forces us to rethink what the current rules
regarding withdrawal from customary law are, how the rules have evolved
to the current view, and (most importantly) what the best approach going
forward is.
This Article addresses some of the issues left open by Bradley and
Gulati’s work. It attempts to judge what approach is better given the
criterion that Bradley and Gulati put forward. Specifically, this article asks
whether the functional benefits of the Default View are greater than those
of the Mandatory View going forward. Using the authors’ standard, I argue
that it is unclear whether a shift to the Default View is best for the system.
Part I of this article discusses the potential effects of Bradley and Gulati’s
thesis on treaty law, an issue of significant importance but one that the
authors do not currently take into account. I then turn to the core of Bradley
and Gulati’s argument—how a shift from the Mandatory View to the
Default View would affect the system of customary international law. Part
II attempts to tease out the essential difference between the Mandatory
View and the Default View for states considering changes to customary
law, while Part III discusses the conditions that would have to hold for the
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Default View to be beneficial using Bradley and Gulati’s functional
standard. The thesis proposed by Bradley and Gulati is worthy of
discussion and debate, but also it also raises questions and concerns that the
authors need to address more fully.
I. TREATY LAW, CUSTOMARY LAW, AND THE DEFAULT VIEW
Bradley and Gulati provide a comprehensive account of the current
state of customary international law, a position that they describe as the
Mandatory View.1 Customary law binds all states, even absent a specific
indication of consent by the state. There are two means by which states can
avoid these obligations: (1) states can claim persistent objector status,
although this is only open to states that objected at the time of the custom’s
formation; or (2) states can deviate from custom by creating a treaty that
establishes a different rule.2 The treaty rule displaces the customary rule as
the operative law between the parties to the treaty, providing the parties
with a means of opting out of custom with like-minded states. Thus even
under the Mandatory View, customary international law is not always
“mandatory.” A state can opt out of custom, even after the formation of the
customary rule, by creating a treaty regime with other like-minded states. If
the treaty has a sufficiently wide membership, it could displace the
customary rule entirely.
Bradley and Gulati’s Default View offers an alternative to the
consensus understanding of when customary international law is binding.
They argue that each state should be able to decide unilaterally what parts
of customary international law to accept. If a state wants to adopt a policy
that is contrary to custom, the state can renounce the customary rule so
long as it does not injure other states. The authors’ basis for advocating this
alternative is twofold. They argue that the Default View is closer to the preWorld War II understanding of custom, although their justification does not
rest on history alone. They further contend that the Default View is a better
approach to customary international law on functional grounds. This
Article only addresses the functional argument.
As an initial consideration when judging the benefits of the two
approaches, we must consider the effect the Default View may have on the
institution of treaty law. Bradley and Gulati pitch their argument as relating
exclusively to the institution of customary law, but the ramifications of
their thesis extend to treaty law as well. Treaty law has become the

1. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J.
202, 208-15 (2010).
2. Id. at 211-12.
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dominant form for legal rules for many areas of international law, including
security law (arms control and use of force), international trade law, and
some areas of human rights (the treatment of combatants and noncombatants in war). Yet changes to the rules governing customary law
influence treaties as well. The two sources of law are deeply intertwined:
shifting to the Default View could have significant ramifications on states’
expectations of how existing treaties will be interpreted and on the ability
of future treaties to establish clear expectations.
Treaties exist in part because of custom. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), which establishes rules for
treaty law, is accepted by some nations—notably the United States—only
as customary law.3 Bradley and Gulati’s Default View would allow states
to withdraw from the Vienna Convention (or parts of the Vienna
Convention) unilaterally. This is significant because it would also allow
states to change the meaning of a treaty. For instance, many existing
treaties take for granted that national governments are responsible for treaty
violations by sub-national government actors as a matter of customary
treaty law.4 A withdrawal from the customary treaty law would allow states
to relieve themselves of the responsibility for these actors. Such a change to
the customary law of treaties could have significant implications on the
meaning of existing treaties, including diplomatic and economic treaties
where the federal government is responsible for the actions of sub-national
actors.5 For instance, the United States government could claim to not be
responsible for the actions of the Texas state officials violations of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Similar examples could be
made using other common treaty rules that are accepted by states as
customary law, including rules on entry in force, ratification, accession,
reservations, breach, or amendment. 6

3. See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 433-34 (2004).
4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1960, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
5. See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12, 20 (Mar. 31) (holding the United States federal government responsible for the actions of Texas
officials); Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug. 30,
2000), 5 ICSID (W. Bank) . 212 (2002) (holding the Mexican government responsible for the actions of
state and local officials).
6. Another issue of importance to U.S. law that the authors’ do not explicitly discuss is the how
the Default View would affect Alien Tort Claims Act suits. If the United States withdrew from a rule of
customary human rights law but other states did not, could federal courts still hear suits based on
foreign violations of the human rights customary law rule? The custom would still be international law
if the US withdrew, but the jurisdictional basis for the suit might disappear if the rule was no longer part
of the United States law.
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Stable customary rules are fundamental to the regime of treaty law.
Although states can alter the Vienna Convention’s treaty rules by explicitly
including different procedural provisions, having a default system of treaty
law procedures is critical to establishing common expectations and
understandings. The Default View threatens to destabilize this shared
understanding on the nature of treaty rules. This is a significant cost given
the extent to which modern economic and security agreements rest on
treaty agreements. And it is a cost that Bradley and Gulati do not address
when evaluating the relative costs of benefits of their proposed approach to
customary law.
II. DEFINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MANDATORY
VIEW AND THE DEFAULT VIEW
The next two parts discuss Bradley and Gulati’s article on its own
terms. This part examines what the essential difference is between the
Mandatory View and the Default View. The next part analyzes what
conditions are necessary for the Default View to be a functionally better
approach for the international system.
Bradley and Gulati describe the current approach as the Mandatory
View, but the current approach does hold that states are always bound to
customary international law in their relations with others. The Mandatory
View incorporates a type of “default” rule. The default rule requires some
agreement from other states, either multilaterally or bilaterally. In practice,
states can select a rule different from the customary rule if the parties
explicitly decide to do so by treaty. The Default View discussed by Bradley
and Gulati is a unilateral version of the Mandatory View’s “default rule”
approach: the state can choose to opt out of customary law by announcing
unilaterally that it no longer intends to follow the rule in the future.7
The difference between the two approaches is not whether states can
opt out of customary international law—states may opt out under both
views—but rather, under what conditions they may do so. The Mandatory
View requires the agreement of the partner state or states, while the Default
View does not require any external consent although this view might
include a notice or no-injury requirement.8 Thus, the major divergence
between the two views is status of the customary law with regard to states
that have not formed treaties to alter the customary rule. The Default View
would provide states with far more leeway to opt out of custom with nontreaty partners, while the Mandatory View would maintain custom as a
7. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 213-15.
8. Id. at 11.
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legal obligation between non-treaty partners. Yet even this understanding
of the Mandatory View may be overly stringent because the decision of
states to contract around the customary rule affects the status of the
relevant rule as custom. The opinio juris element of the customary rule is
undermined if many states choose to deviate from it by creating contrary
treaty law. For example, customary rules on international investment are
currently undergoing such a re-examination.9 The traditional rule that states
must reimburse foreign investors for any government expropriation has
long been contested,10 but the recent trend towards bilateral investment
treaties (notwithstanding the failure to reach a multilateral investment
agreement) has led some arbitrators and scholars to conclude that these
treaties are reshaping customary international law.11
The extent of the difference between the two views may turn on how
broadly the Default View’s restriction on notice and no-injury is
interpreted. Bradley and Gulati observe that the historical Default View
included an injury restriction. In the author’s discussion of pre-World War
II international law scholars, they note Vattel’s understanding was that
states are only able to withdraw from custom “at a time when no particular
Nation will be affected by the new rule.”12 Bradley and Gulati appear to
embrace this restriction in their understanding of the Default View,
although the contours of the restriction as interpreted by Bradley and Gulati
are ambiguous.13 The line could be drawn either with regard to the
historical practice or with regard to what the optimal rule would be today
(the two might be different). But the authors’ present explanation of the
boundaries of this injury requirement is too opaque to make any predictions
about what customary law would be eligible for withdrawal under the
Default View.
This is an area that the authors (or others) need to flesh out more if we
are to have a realistic picture of how the Default View would function. We
could have a robust form of this restriction—no withdrawal that affects the
interests of another state is permitted – or a weak form—withdrawal is
permitted so long as it is not opportunistic. These two forms of the
9. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 536 (John H. Jackson ed., 2d.
ed. 2008).
10. See id. at 536-37.
11. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 128-30 (2003).
12. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 217 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF
NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 385-86 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916)
(1758).
13. See id. at 213-23, 250-51 & 252.
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restriction have very different implications for when the Default View
permits withdrawal in areas where customary law is influential.
For example, in international investment law, the robust form of the
injury restriction would seem to prevent states from withdrawing from
customary rules to respect foreign investment with regard to any existing
investments.14 Withdrawing from these customary rules would adversely
affect the interests of foreign private investors, and by extension, the
investors’ home state. States would be free to withdraw from customary
rules regarding future investments, although, as a domestic policy option,
this might be significantly less politically desirable to the host government.
By contrast, the weak form of the restriction would allow the state to
withdraw from customary rules on investment with regard to existing
investments, so long as the state was not acting opportunistically. This
could occur where a state did not take an ownership interest in the property
wished to enact rules to restrict the property’s use, such as rigorous
environmental standards. Some investment arbitration panels have found
environmental regulation to be a form of expropriation, and thus the state
might want to withdraw from customary rules out of concern that the
environmental regulations would run afoul of international investment
rule.15 Here, the state would not be acting opportunistically—the
regulations could be adopted in a non-discriminatory manner and with no
intent to appropriate the foreign investment.
A different issue arises with the customary law of human rights. In
this area of law, states have interest in the global respect for human rights,
not just the human rights of its nationals. Thus, a state’s interests are
implicated whenever there is an alteration of human rights law with regard
to any person anywhere. Under the robust form of the restriction, states
would never be allowed to withdraw from human rights custom. Under the
weak form of the restriction, the issue would be whether the state was
acting opportunistically—for instance, withdrawing human rights
guarantees during periods of political unrest or during elections. The weak

14. The substance of customary international law regarding foreign investment is contested. See,
e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 9, at Part VI. Nonetheless, customary international law is still viewed by
many scholars as including minimum standards for foreign investment. See, e.g., SURYA P. SUBEDI,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 55 (2008). Arbitration
panels also frequently find that customary international law includes minimum standards. See, e.g.,
Loewen Group v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (June 26, 2003), 7
ICSID (W. Bank) 442 (2005) (holding that the trial in question and the verdict rendered are
incompatible with “minimum standards of international law”).
15. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp., supra note 5. For a discussion of these issues, see generally Vicki
Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protection and the
Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (2003).
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version may therefore allow states to withdraw from some non-jus cogens
human rights protections during periods of relative social and political
calm.
In short, the difference between the Mandatory View and the
Default View need not be tremendous, although it is hard to know its true
extent given the current formulation of the Default View. The Mandatory
View permits states to withdraw from custom by treaty—that is, withdraw
with bilateral or multilateral consent—while the Default View allows states
to withdraw from custom unilaterally, subject to an injury restriction. The
stronger the Default View’s restrictions on withdrawal, the more the
Mandatory View and Default View converge. Yet there is still a significant
area where a shift from the Mandatory View to the Default View would be
important.
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF SHIFTING FROM THE
MANDATORY TO THE DEFAULT VIEW
As Bradley and Gulati discuss, shifting between these regimes has
costs and benefits.16 My discussion draws on the points that they raise and
evaluates the costs and benefits using the standards that Bradley and Gulati
do.17 Both the Mandatory View and the Default View incorporate the use
of default rules, but each permits states to withdraw from custom on
different terms. Adopting the functional view that Bradley and Gulati take,
which approach is best depends on the relative costs of each.18 This Part
evaluates those costs and examines the conditions in which each approach
would be optimal.
A. Defining the Costs and Benefits
One state’s withdrawal from custom can impose significant costs on
other states. The Mandatory View provides some protection to this class of
potentially injured parties. The withdrawing state must seek the consent of
the other states through treaty negotiations. The affected state can thus
demand compensation for any injury during treaty negotiations. So long as
the withdrawing state’s benefit from establishing a new rule is greater than
the costs of the change to the other state, a treaty should be possible.19
16. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 241-54.
17. This Part’s discussion of the Default View incorporates the weak form of the restriction on the
state’s ability to withdraw from custom so that the two views will not converge.
18. Of course we can have non-functional goals as well. Others in this symposium address this
issue so I limit my discussion to evaluating the author’s claims on their own terms.
19. The ability of states to alter rules by treaty should also permit the emergence of efficient rules
under the Mandatory View.
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The Default View does not protect against such harm to the same
degree. The withdrawing state may decide to opt out of the custom
unilaterally. Thus the Default View would permit a state to withdraw from
custom even when the costs of the withdrawal are higher for the rest of the
world than the benefits to the withdrawing state.20 Here, the international
system may experience a loss of welfare that would not have been possible
under the Mandatory View. Under the Default View, states might still
engage in treaty negotiations to establish an alternative rule, but the injured
states would be seeking a treaty with the withdrawing state. Unlike the
Mandatory View, the withdrawing state would not have to compensate the
injured state for any damage done. Rather, the withdrawing state would be
able to extract some concessions from the injured state as the price of
agreeing to the new treaty rule.
The disadvantage of the Mandatory View, as Bradley and Gulati
note, is the possibility for high transaction costs or holdout problems.21
Negotiating bilateral or multilateral alternatives to custom can be
expensive, particularly for smaller states. States may also resist forming
mutually beneficial treaties in an attempt to gain a greater share of the joint
gains.22 However, these costs also exist under the Default View. If a
withdrawing state opts out of a customary rule and thereby creates a net
loss for the international system, then these same transaction costs may be
incurred as states attempt to negotiate an alternative rule through treaty
law. Under the Default View, the withdrawing state would simply be the
state be in the position to hold out from the agreement and extract more of
the joint gains from any subsequent agreement.
B. Evaluating Each Approach
Both approaches to customary law allow states to opt out of custom
but do so on different terms. Consequently, much of the analysis of which
approach is more desirable depends on our perception of the value of
contemporary customary international law. If most international custom
could be altered without any loss to the international system, then the
20. We observe escape clauses in treaties where the benefits to one state of exiting the treaty are
higher than the costs to the treaty partners. See Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A
Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255,
298 (1991) (“A politically Pareto optimal escape clause would not allow parties to revoke concessions
at will, but constrains escape to circumstances in which the gains to the party avoiding concessions
exceed the costs to its trading partners.”).
21. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 41-42 (discussing the holdout problem under the
Mandatory View).
22. See generally James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52
INT’L ORG. 269 (1998).
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Mandatory View appears to impose unreasonably high transaction costs on
states attempting to opt out of custom. Beneficial changes to international
custom (i.e. changes that result in more gain for the withdrawing state than
losses to other states) may not occur because of transaction costs. I will call
these Type A costs—net beneficial alterations to customary law that are not
undertaken because of the transaction costs of negotiating the change. But
if most international custom is a net benefit for the international system—
that is, changes to the custom would impose greater costs on the
international system than benefits gained by the withdrawing party—then
the Default View is overly permissive. The Default View would allow one
state to impose a net cost on the international system unilaterally. These are
Type B costs—unilateral changes to customary law that impose a net cost.
At a system level, we are interested in minimizing the combination
of Type A and Type B costs. The decision of whether to adopt the
Mandatory View or the Default View depends on our relative concern
about Type A costs (which are minimized by the Default View) and Type
B costs (which are minimized by the Mandatory View). If we have good ex
ante beliefs about what type of cost is more likely in different categories of
custom, then we could adopt specific rules for different categories of
custom. For instance, the Mandatory View could govern human rights law,
while the Default View could govern international investment law. If we do
not have good ex ante beliefs about different categories of custom, then the
best approach would be a uniform rule for all custom.
Evaluating the two approaches along functional lines, we need to have
a belief about the quality of customary international law. If customary
international law already incorporates rules that are net welfare increasing
for the international community, then a shift towards the Default View may
be welfare decreasing. Bradley and Gulati do not provide us a reason to
believe that current international law is in need of significant change. They
argue that the fact that the system of international customary law has not
been changed does not mean that customary international law is efficient.23
While this is a valid point, the authors fail to make the affirmative case that
the rules established by customary international law (either all or some) are
inefficient at the system level. Without such a case, the argument for the
Default View remains incomplete.
CONCLUSION
Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati have proposed a novel and
provocative approach to international law. Their work has and will spur
23. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 242.
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debate on the historic approaches to customary international law, the
evolution of the current consensus view on international law, and whether
we should maintain this consensus view in the future. Yet even on the
authors’ own functional standard, it is unclear whether a shift to the Default
View is desirable. Significant questions remain, including the effect of a
change on treaty law, the contours of the Default View, and whether a
system of unilateral withdrawal from custom would be beneficial for the
international system.

